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Abstract 
Using detailed firm-level data, we analyze Spain’s Pharmaceutical Research Program, 
and find differences between the ex ante announced evaluation criteria and their ex post 
implementation. By studying the program’s implementation, we also uncover that the apparent 
discrimination against non-European firms is due to the heavy penalty placed on not having local 
production plants. In this sense the R&D support program works in part as a production support 
program. Our analysis suggests that the design of public R&D programs cannot be judged 
exclusively on their results. Analyzing the implementation stage is equally important.  
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Introduction. 
Given its importance, the design of public support programs for innovation has received 
much attention (Martin and Scott, 2000; Trajtenberg, 2002). To evaluate the effectiveness of such 
programs, the literature has relied on both case studies and firm-level microeconometric evidence 
(Klette, Møen and Griliches, 2000; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). However, between a program’s 
design and its outcome there is an important intermediate step: its implementation. A well designed 
program may fail if poorly implemented.   
To judge the success of a program, one should take into account possible differences 
between its ex ante design and its ex post implementation. Moreover, we may only be able to 
understand a program’s design by looking at its implementation. For instance, a program may 
reward firms on the basis of both research and commercial success, but only its implementation can 
tell us the relative importance of these criteria. Focusing on Spain’s National Pharmaceutical 
Research Program, we use a unique firm-level data set to explore these issues. Our aim is twofold: 
on the one hand, highlight the gap between design and implementation, and on the other hand, 
uncover the priorities of the program by analyzing its implementation.  
We look at Profarma, the most recent Spanish government support program for 
pharmaceutical research, which ran from 1998 to 2000. All firms applying to take part in Profarma 
got ranked by a committee of the Ministry of Science and Technology. This ranking translated into 
financial support and other non-monetary benefits, such as faster approval or beneficial pricing of 
new drugs. The official call for applications explicitly stated the ranking criteria. Using the 
application forms as our primary data source, we were able to manually extract all relevant 
quantifiable criteria on a firm by firm basis. This information then allowed us to determine which of 
the criteria were effectively used, and their relative importance. 
The first important result is that we indeed find significant differences between the ex ante 
announced criteria and the ex post applied criteria. A number of variables specifically stated in the 
call for applications, such as having an R&D center or the ratio of R&D spending to sales, turn out 
to be statistically unimportant under a variety of different specifications. Such differences may be 
due to discrepancies between the government’s true objectives and its announced policy, or it may 
reflect a gap between the policy defined by the higher levels of government and its implementation 
by lower executive levels.  
The second important result we uncover is a premium for Spanish and European Union 
firms. More specifically, on a scale from 1 to 6, the probability of getting a grade of 4 or above 
increases by 0.61 for Spanish companies, and by 0.45 for European Union firms. However, after 
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dropping the firms without production plants in Spain from the sample, this preferential treatment 
disappears. Our results therefore suggest that not producing locally is heavily penalized. This raises 
the question upto which degree this is a program to encourage research rather than an indirect way 
of subsidizing production and employment. A similar point is made in Trajtenberg (2002), who 
questions the Israeli policy of making R&D subsidies conditional on future production in the 
country. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 gives some background 
on the Spanish government support plan to the pharmaceutical industry; Section 3 analyzes the 
program Profarma; and Section 4 provides some closing remarks.  
 
1. Spain’s National Pharmaceutical Research Program.  
2.1.   Brief background. 
Until recently innovation in the European pharmaceutical industry depended on organic 
chemistry, the industry’s traditional knowledge base. Over the last couple of decades, however, the 
pharmaceutical industry has been increasingly shifting towards biotechnology. This knowledge shift 
has also meant a geographical shift: with the possible exception of British firms, the competitive 
advantage of European companies has eroded, with the U.S. pharmaceutical industry becoming the 
clear leader (see Gambardella et al., 2000 and Jacobzone, 2000). This has prompted European 
national governments and the European Union to design plans to counter this trend.1 
As for the pharmaceutical industry in Spain, in the late seventies it was made up of 
multinationals and a large number of small family-owned laboratories. These small companies, 
which accounted for a substantial share of the market, focused on the production of pharmaceutical 
specialties. They either imported active substances from countries with no patents, or they had 
license agreements with multinationals. The lack of patent protection opened the door for the more 
dynamic Spanish companies to copy new drugs, sometimes leading to developments in formulation 
and dosage.  
The 1980s witnessed major restructuring, as multinationals took over many of the smaller 
Spanish firms, which were unable to survive the breakup of the locally protected market. Spain’s 
entry into the European Union exposed the national industry to greater competition. The common 
                                                 
1
 See European Commission 93/718 (2 May 1994) for more details on the policy implications of the eroding 
competitive position of the European pharmaceutical industry.  
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market meant the removal of both tariff and non-tariff barriers, through, for instance, the 
harmonization of market regulations. In addition, the 1985 Adhesion Treaty obliged Spain to 
implement full patent protection, until then largely absent.  This prompted the first major initiative 
to support R&D and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
When the National Pharmaceutical Research Program took off in 1986, the local industry 
lacked the capacity to innovate, R&D was virtually non-existent, and Spain was absent from 
international markets. Government support to R&D in the pharmaceutical industry has since then 
gone through four successive plans: Farma I (1986-1990), Farma II (1991-1993), Farma III (1994-
1997) and Profarma (1998-2000). 
 
2.2.   The most recent government support plan: Profarma. 
This paper focuses on Profarma, the most recent public program fomenting R&D in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  It ran from 1998 to 2000, with the aim of “establishing a procedure to 
support research and the introduction of new production technologies for pharmaceuticals and raw 
materials.” In the official call for applications this objective was translated into four quantifiable 
goals:1 one, R&D expenses as a proportion of sales of ethical drugs should reach 8%; two, R&D 
expenses and investments should rise to 312 million €; three, there should be at least 3000 
employees in research activities; and, four, the worsening trade balance should be improved.  
Participating firms got evaluated and ordered into different categories. This ranking had 
different ramifications. On the one hand, it translated into financial aid for specific research 
projects. This financial aid came in the form of direct subsidies or zero interest loans. On the other 
hand, receiving a good grade had a reputation effect, helpful when it came to price setting or 
speeding up the approval of new products. Arguably, firms were mostly interested in this non-
monetary aspect, as the magnitude of subsidies was limited: it represented a mere 2.20% of R&D 
investment by participating firms in 1998; this already low figure dropped further to a dismal 0.65% 
by 2000.1 The importance of non-monetary benefits is also reflected by the fact that certain firms 
applied to participate in Profarma without asking for research funding.  
Apart from rewarding – and thus fomenting – R&D, the public administration was also 
interested in covering the market as well as possible, since ranking firms provided it with useful 
                                                 
1
 The full text of the call for applications is available at http://www.mcyt.es/idlap/objetivos.htm 
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information.  In that sense Profarma can be called a success: in its last year the program included 
56 firms, making up 85% of the market in terms of sales.2  
 
3.  Empirical analysis of Profarma (1998-2000).  
The objective of our empirical analysis is twofold. On the one hand, using data on all 
companies that participated in Profarma, we want to contrast the ex ante announced criteria with 
their ex post implementation by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology. On the other 
hand, we want see what the implementation tells us about the program’s priorities. Special attention 
will be given to trying to understand the apparent premium firms receive for being Spanish or 
European.  
 
3.1. Data and evaluation procedure 
As shown in Figure 1, the procedure to rank firms is based on both scientific and economic 
criteria. The scientific evaluation is responsibility of the Scientific Assessment Committee. The 
committee’s members are government officials from the Ministry of Science and Technology and 
the Ministry of Health. With the help of outside consultants they assign a scientific grade to each 
company after evaluating their scientific capacity. The economic evaluation is responsibility of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, and is based on a number of quantifiable criteria that firms 
provide on their application form. The final grade is a combination of the scientific grade and the 
economic evaluation.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
The data were collected manually, using the application forms of all firms as our primary 
data source. The Ministry of Science and Technology also provided us with the scientific grades. 
Our data set therefore covers the entire population of participating firms. In 1998 the Ministry of 
Science and Technology received 51 applications; in 1999 that number remained stable at 50; and 
in 2000 there was a slight increase to 56 applications. Taking into account missing values for some 
companies, we were eventually left with around 150 observations.  
                                                                                                                                                     
1
 It should be mentioned, however, that in the year 2000 the Ministry of Science and Technology started 
providing zero interest loans, in addition to direct financial support. Unfortunately, we do not have data on 
their magnitude.  
2
 Total sales of participating firms amounted to 7716 million €, whereas total sales of the sector were 9049 
million € (according to data of the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica).   
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We now give a list of all the variables we will use in our empirical analysis. This 
information is summarized in Figure 2. 
 (Insert Figure 2 here) 
1. The scientific grade classifies companies into 5 different groups. Since this 
classification presents a mere ordering, we do not assign number grades to the different 
groups. Instead, we rely on dummy variables to tell us the numerical distance between 
grades. (The names of the dummies used in the subsequent econometric analysis are 
given in brackets.) 
a. Companies of Group A (companies with research activity and production plants 
in Spain) and Group C (with research activity and no production plants) are 
classified into the following categories: 
• Excellent (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE 5) 
• Very good (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE 4) 
• Good (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE 3) 
• Acceptable (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE 2) 
b. Companies of Group B with development activities and production plants, but 
no research (SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADE 1).1 
 
2. For the economic criteria, we use all available information from the application forms. 
Roughly speaking, these correspond to the indicators announced in the call for 
applications by the Ministry of Science and Technology. (Again, the names of variables 
appear in brackets.)  
• The existence of an R&D center in the company. (R&D CENTER; if center exist 
R&D CENTER = 1; if not, R&D CENTER = 0).  
• R&D spending as a fraction of sales. (R&D/SALES). 
• Outside cooperation. (COOPERATION=1 if company cooperates with outside 
firms or institutions; COOPERATION = 0 if it does not). 
• Patent expenses, in millions of €. (PATENT SPENDING). 
• R&D investment, in millions of €. (R&D INVESTMENT). 
                                                 
1
 To be precise, firms in Group B are divided into “Positive” and “Negative” ones. However, none of the 
firms got classified into the “Negative” group. 
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• Total investment, in millions of €. (TOTAL INVESTMENT). 
• Sales of pharmaceuticals, in millions of €. (SALES PHARMACEUTICALS). 
• Sales of raw materials, in millions of €. (SALES RAW MATERIALS) 
• Trade balance, in millions of €. (TRADE BALANCE). 
• Net profits, in millions of € (NET ACCOUNTING PROFIT). 
 
3. The scientific grade and the economic criteria give rise to a final grade, which orders 
companies into different categories. To facilitate our analysis, we assign corresponding 
number grades to these different groups. However, since the final grades should not be 
viewed as a cardinal ranking, we will use an ordered probit as our estimation technique.   
a. Group A: Companies with research activity and production plants. 
• Excellent (number grade 6) 
• Very good (number grade 5) 
• Good (number grade 4) 
• Acceptable (number grade 3)  
b. Group B: Companies with development activities and production plants 
(number grade 2)  
c. Group C: Companies with research activity and no production plants (number 
grade 1). 
In the subsequent econometric analysis the final grade will be the dependent variable, with 
the economic criteria and the scientific grade as the regressors. 
  
3.2. Ex ante criteria vs. ex post implementation by the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
Although the official call for applications by the Ministry of Science and Technology 
specified the evaluation criteria, it did not reveal the relative importance of each one of them. To 
see how the ex post implementation may have differed from the ex ante announcement, we look at 
what the data tell us about the actual evaluation process.  
This gives us the following basic estimating equation, where the dependent variable is the 
final grade and the regressors are the economic criteria and the scientific dummy grades:  
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       FINAL GRADE i
 
=∑
j
αj
 
ECONOMIC CRITERION ij +∑
k
βk SCIENTIFIC DUMMY GRADEik + εi         (1) 
The basic observation i is a firm-year. Since the final grade reflects an ordinal – rather than a 
cardinal – ranking, we use an ordered probit to estimate equation (1). Indeed, our ranking says that 
a final grade of 6 is better than a final grade of 5, and that a final grade of 5 is better than a final 
grade of 4, without implying that the difference between 6 and 5 is the same as the difference 
between 5 and 4.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
The results are reported in Table 1. Column (1) regresses the final grade on all economic 
criteria and on the scientific dummy grades. The numbers in brackets give the P-values. To 
facilitate reading, the coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level. Apart from the 
scientific grades, four variables fall into that category: patent spending, R&D investment, the sales 
of pharmaceuticals and the trade balance. The coefficients on all of these four variables are positive, 
so that an increase in any one of them has a positive effect on the final grade. As can be seen in 
column (1), the effect of the scientific dummy grade is measured relative to “scientific dummy 
grade 3”, which has been dropped from the regression. Not surprisingly, grades higher than 3 have a 
positive effect on the final grade, whereas grades lower than 3 have a negative effect.  
 With a data set of 150 observations using four dummy variables for the different scientific 
grades is potentially costly in terms of loss in degrees of freedom. To remedy this issue, we would 
like to reduce these different dummies to just one variable. Our results in column (1) suggest that 
the difference in coefficients between any two adjacent scientific dummy grades is not too different 
from 1. It therefore seems acceptable to interpret the ordinal ranking of the five scientific dummy 
grades as a cardinal ranking. As can be seen in column (2), this approximation is reasonable. The 
variables which are statistically significant at the 5% level are the same as those in column (1); the 
values of their coefficients change very little; and more importantly, the estimation is more precise, 
as reflected by their generally lower P-values.  
Another question of interest is whether the evaluation process changed over the three years 
of the plan. To explore this possibility, in column (3) we introduce time dummies for 1999 and for 
2000. Neither show up to be significant. We also investigated whether the coefficients of the 
different independent variables changed from year to year. This is not the case, so we refrain from 
reporting the results here.  
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Our results in column (1) through (3) suggest that some of the variables we would think 
measure R&D effort turn out to be statistically insignificant. This is the case of, for instance, having 
an R&D center or collaborating with outside firms and institutions. These variables were 
supposedly important in the ex ante call for applications, but do not seem to have mattered for the 
ex post implementation of the plan. One possible reason could of course be that the scientific grade 
picks up the effect of these variables. To see whether this is the case, column (4) drops the scientific 
grade from the regression. As can be seen, this does not change the variables which are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Given the possible concern about multicollinearity, we further 
experimented with dropping certain variables, based on the correlogram in Table 2. None of the 
results changed significantly. This is not surprising: as shown in Table 2, correlations between 
variables are not excessively high. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
We now turn to the quantitative interpretation of our results. To do so, we focus on column 
(2) of Table 1, which includes all economic criteria and the scientific grade as regressors. Given 
that we are using an ordered probit, the coefficients in Table 1 do not have a direct interpretation. 
For instance, the coefficient 0.745 on the “scientific grade” does not mean that an increase in the 
scientific grade by 1 point leads to an increase in the final grade of 0.745. This is because we are 
interpreting the final grade as a mere ordinal ranking, so that an increase in the final grade of 0.75 
does not have a precise meaning. Instead, with an ordered probit the relevant question to ask is how 
the probability of getting one grade, rather than another, changes in function of the explanatory 
variables. Table 3 gives us this information. Consider, for instance, the line with the scientific 
grade. An increase in the scientific grade by 1 point decreases the probability of getting a final 
grade of 1, 2 and 3 by, respectively, 0.13, 0.13 and 0.04; and it increases the probability of getting a 
final grade of 4, 5 and 6 by, respectively, 0.05, 0.09 and 0.16.  
To interpret the other four variables which are statistically significant – patent spending, 
R&D investment, sales of pharmaceuticals and the trade balance – we look at how the probability of 
getting a high grade (above 3) changes when we increase each of these variables by one standard 
deviation. For patent spending this raises the probability of getting a high grade by 0.13; for R&D 
investment the probability goes up by 0.14; for sales of pharmaceuticals we get a figure of 0.21; and 
for the trade balance we find 0.18.  
 (Insert Table 3 here) 
From this section we can conclude that certain criteria which were ex ante announced to be 
important turned out not to matter ex post: this is the case of, for instance, having an R&D center, 
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the ratio of R&D spending to sales, and cooperating with other firms and institutions. Of the four 
variables that do matter, in addition to the scientific grade, only two seem justifiable from the point 
of view of rewarding firms that excel in R&D: patent spending and investment in R&D. A third 
variable, sales of pharmaceuticals, may make sense if we think that it measures translating R&D 
into commercial success. The fourth variable, the trade balance, has more to do with industrial 
policy than with encouraging R&D. Rewarding companies that export a lot and import little is 
reminiscent of the mercantilist idea that “exports are good and imports are bad”. It may also reflect 
a preference for domestic production as a way of creating employment.  
 
3.3. Uncovering the premium to Spanish and European Union firms. 
In this section we address the question whether Spanish (or European Union) companies 
received favorable treatment. Over the three years considered, Spanish firms obtained an average 
final grade of 3.75 on a scale from 1 to 6, compared to 3.65 for European Union firms and 3.15 for 
firms from the rest of the world.  
These higher grades could of course simply reflect better R&D performance by Spanish 
firms. At first sight, the data lend support to this explanation. Figure 3 shows R&D expenditure as a 
ratio of sales of ethical drugs, distinguishing between firms from Spain, the European Union, and 
the rest of the world. As can be seen, Spanish firms performed clearly better than the rest. However, 
not all R&D indicators point in the same direction. For instance, the average scientific grade for 
Spanish firms stood at 3.7, substantially lower than the 4.1 for non-European Union firms.  
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
Regardless of what these indicators tell us, our goal is to check whether there is any 
residual preferential treatment after controlling for all the economic criteria and the scientific grade.  
We therefore regress the final grade on the same list of indicators as before, with the only difference 
that we now include two dummy variables to control for the origin of firms: the dummy SPANISH 
FIRM takes on value 1 if more than 50% of the firm’s capital is Spanish and 0 if not; similarly, the 
variable EUROPEAN UNION FIRM takes on value 1 if more than 50% of its capital is from the 
European Union and value 0 if not.   
Table 4 reports the results for our ordered probit estimation. Column (1) suggests that 
Spanish and European Union firms received preferential treatment: after controlling for all 
economic criteria and the scientific grade, the coefficients on SPANISH FIRM and EUROPEAN 
UNION firm are positive and statistically significant. As for the other explanatory variables, there 
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are two changes compared to our previous results. First, patent spending ceases to be significant. 
Second, the trade balance becomes insignificant in favor of the sales of raw materials.  Note that 
this latter change does not affect our previous conclusions, since the trade balance and the sales of 
raw materials reflect the same concern of the public administration: the reduction of imports (and 
possibly domestic job creation). Indeed, firms that produce their own raw materials (and sell them) 
tend to be vertically integrated, and need not rely on imports for their production.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
As before, certain variables could be statistically insignificant, because their effect is picked 
up by the scientific grade. In column (2) we therefore leave out the scientific grade, and find that 
patent spending and the trade balance now show up to be significant. Another interesting 
observation: the preferential treatment of Spanish and European Union firms is bigger when we 
include the scientific grade than when we do not. In addition, the relative advantage of being from 
Spain rather than from the European Union is also greater. This reflects a simple fact: Spanish firms 
got on average a scientific grade of 3.7, compared to 3.9 for European Union firms, and 4.1 for 
firms from the rest of the world.  
To interpret the payoff for being from Spain or from the EU, we focus on column (1), and 
calculate what the coefficients imply about the probabilities of getting a high final grade. The 
results are reported in Table 5. Being Spanish increases the probability of getting a high final grade 
(above 3 on a scale from 1 to 6) by 0.61. In the case of European Union firms, the effect is 0.45. To 
put these magnitudes into perspective, the effect of being Spanish is equivalent to an increase in the 
scientific grade by 1.65 points (on a scale from 1 to 5). It is also equivalent to increasing 
pharmaceutical sales by 3 standard deviations, and raising R&D investment by more than 4 
standard deviations.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
This leaves us with the question of what the underlying reason is for the premium received 
by Spanish and European Union firms. One possible explanation is that R&D by Spanish firms is 
more likely going to lead to production in Spain. To test this hypothesis, in column (3) we re-run 
our standard regression on the subgroup of firms that have production plants in Spain. This amounts 
to leaving out 15 observations. When doing so, the preferential treatment disappears. Though 
striking, this result is not entirely surprising. As mentioned before, when the Ministry of Science 
and Technology assigns the final grade, firms with R&D activities but no production plants get 
relegated to Group C, corresponding to the lowest grade.  
  11 
  
This means that firms get heavily penalized for not having production plants. Since these 
firms are by and large from outside the European Union, this shows up as favorable treatment to 
local firms. This explains some of our previous findings. Whereas Spanish firms get on average a 
low scientific grade of 3.7, compared to a higher 4.1 for non-European firms, they end up with a 
high final grade of 3.75, compared to a lower 3.15 for non-European firms. Such a policy of 
fomenting local production is not uncommon. For instance, Israel, a basket case for successful 
public support to R&D, makes subsidies conditional on future production in the country. However, 
if that is the case, part of the subsidies to R&D should be counted as production or employment 
subsidies (Trajtenberg, 2002). 
 
4. Concluding remarks. 
This paper has studied how the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology ranked 
pharmaceutical companies in the framework of Profarma, a government plan aimed at fomenting 
R&D. The focus has been on the implementation of the plan, rather than on its design. By using 
detailed firm-level data, we have shown remarkable differences between the ex ante announced 
selection criteria and the ex post criteria the Ministry applied. By uncovering differences between 
design and implementation, our paper suggests that when evaluating government R&D plans, too 
much attention may be given to analyzing the optimality of the design or to studying the 
achievement of the objectives, and too little to its actual implementation. Even if selection criteria 
are optimal, the plan may fail if its implementation falls short.   
Moreover, we have shown that the premium for being Spanish or European can be 
explained by the large penalty placed on firms that do not produce locally. This suggests that 
encouraging production and employment – and not just R&D – is also one of the program’s main 
priorities.  
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FIGURE 1 
EVALUATION PROCEDURE AND DETERMINANTS OF THE FINAL GRADE. 
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FIGURE 2 
FIRMS’ TYPOLOGY 
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FIGURE 3 
R&D EXPENDITURE / SALES OF ETHICAL DRUGS 
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TABLE 1 
DETERMINANTS OF THE FINAL GRADE (ORDERED PROBIT) 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FINAL GRADE 
   
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R&D CENTER -0.010 0.074 0.169 0.054 
 (0.972) (0.793) (0.543) (0.854) 
R&D/SALES -4.951 -3.772 -0.584 -3.805 
 (0.068) (0.149) (0.813) (0.146) 
COOPERATION -0.668 -0.606 -0.828 -0.606 
 (0.185) (0.213) (0.083) (0.213) 
PATENT SPENDING 3.189 3.256 5.111 3.307 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.000) (0.012) 
R&D INVESTMENT 0.424 0.454 0.665 0.464 
 (0.044) (0.018) (0.001) (0.018) 
TOTAL INVESTMENT -0.026 -0.032 -0.023 -0.031 
 (0.296) (0.198) (0.332) (0.213) 
SALES PHARMACEUTICALS 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.000) (0.016) 
SALES RAW MATERIALS 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.247) (0.179) (0.241) (0.182) 
TRADE BALANCE 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
NET ACCOUNTING PROFIT -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.848) (0.921) (0.772) (0.965) 
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 
 
0.745  0.741 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 1 -1.204 
   
 (0.000)    
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 2 -0.281    
 (0.294)    
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 4 1.170 
   
 (0.002)    
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 5 2.191 
   
 (0.000)    
YEAR 2000 
   -0.028 
 
   (0.900) 
YEAR 1999 
   -0.071 
 
   (0.763) 
 
    
Pseudo R2 0.294 0.284 0.19 0.284 
P-values given in brackets. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 2 
CORRELOGRAM OF REGRESSORS 
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R&D CENTER 1             
R&D/SALES -0.1233 1            
COOPERATION -0.1045 -0.2014 1           
PATENT SPENDING 0.1823 0.1532 -0.2415 1          
R&D INVESTMENT 0.1703 0.0151 0.0310 0.0394 1         
TOTAL INVESTMENT 0.1784 -0.2162 0.0501 0.0592 0.5061 1        
SALES RAW MATERIALS 0.1263 -0.0335 0.0079 0.2515 0.1740 0.3864 1       
TRADE BALANCE 0.3302 0.2602 -0.1142 0.2012 -0.2111 -0.1570 0.1958 1      
NET ACCOUNTING PROFIT 0.1116 -0.1272 0.0569 0.0970 0.2962 0.4071 0.3404 -0.2017 1     
SPANISH FIRM 0.2374 0.1708 -0.0112 0.3689 0.0318 -0.1401 0.0512 0.4736 -0.0352 1    
EUROPEAN UNION FIRM 0.1733 -0.1712 -0.1159 -0.1779 -0.0472 0.0464 -0.1566 -0.1539 0.0829 -0.5763 1   
SALES PHARMACEUTICALS -0.1411 -0.2870 0.1157 -0.0314 0.4876 0.5774 0.2972 -0.6231 0.6141 -0.2955 0.0797 1  
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 0.1015 0.0980 -0.1212 0.3493 0.4986 0.4002 0.2716 -0.1863 0.3989 -0.0949 0.0175 0.4990 1 
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 TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF EVALUATION CRITERIA ON THE PROBABILITY OF GETTING 
DIFFERENT FINAL GRADES 
 
PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING 
  
FINAL GRADE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
      
R&D CENTER -0.0127 -0.0127 -0.0040 0.0046 0.0087 0.0162 
R&D/SALES 0.6493 0.6464 0.2059 -0.2336 -0.4436 -0.8244 
COOPERATION 0.1043 0.1038 0.0331 -0.0375 -0.0713 -0.1324 
PATENT SPENDING -0.5604 -0.5579 -0.1777 0.2016 0.3829 0.7115 
R&D INVESTMENT -0.0782 -0.0778 -0.0248 0.0281 0.0534 0.0993 
TOTAL INVESTMENT 0.0054 0.0054 0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0037 -0.0069 
SALES PHARMACEUTICALS -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 
SALES RAW MATERIALS -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0017 
TRADE BALANCE -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0011 0.0021 
NET ACCOUNTING PROFIT 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
SCIENTIFIC GRADE -0.1282 -0.1276 -0.0407 0.0461 0.0876 0.1628 
These results are based on the regression in column (2) of Table 1. The numbers in bold correspond to 
criteria which are statistically significant at the 5% level. To interpret this table, focus on the scientific grade 
(the last line). An increase in the scientific grade by 1 point decreases the probability of getting a final grade 
of 1 by 0.1282, and it increases the probability of getting a final grade of 6 by 0.1628.    
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TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF THE FINAL GRADE (ORDERED PROBIT),  
CONTROLLING FOR FIRM ORIGIN 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FINAL GRADE 
  
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
R&D CENTER -0.426 -0.134 0.108 
 (0.18) (0.66) (0.86) 
R&D/SALES -3.893 -0.158 9.686 
 (0.17) (0.95) (0.23) 
COOPERATION -0.511 -0.692 1.135 
 (0.30) (0.15) (0.17) 
PATENT SPENDING 1.624 4.804 1.553 
 (0.26) (0.00) (0.51) 
R&D INVESTMENT 0.459 0.748 0.365 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.30) 
TOTAL INVESTMENT -0.017 -0.017 -0.050 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.27) 
SALES PHARMACEUTICALS 0.005 0.007 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.29) 
SALES RAW MATERIALS 0.018 0.012 0.024 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
TRADE BALANCE 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.36) 
NET ACCOUNTING PROFIT -0.011 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.36) (0.88) (0.58) 
SCIENTIFIC GRADE 0.931  3.644 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
SPANISH FIRM 1.533 0.672 -0.417 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.51) 
EUROPEAN UNION FIRM 1.132 0.764 -0.748 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.19) 
 
   
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.21 0.83 
Number of observations 149 149 134 
P-values given in brackets. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 5 
EFFECT OF EVALUATION CRITERIA ON THE PROBABILITY OF GETTING 
DIFFERENT FINAL GRADES, CONTROLLING FOR  FIRM ORIGIN 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING 
  
FINAL GRADE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
      
R&D CENTER 0.0734 0.0731 0.0233 -0.0264 -0.0501 -0.0932 
R&D/SALES 0.6701 0.6671 0.2125 -0.2411 -0.4578 -0.8508 
COOPERATION 0.0879 0.0875 0.0279 -0.0316 -0.0601 -0.1116 
PATENT SPENDING -0.2796 -0.2783 -0.0886 0.1006 0.1910 0.3550 
R&D INVESTMENT -0.0789 -0.0786 -0.0250 0.0284 0.0539 0.1002 
TOTAL INVESTMENT 0.0030 0.0030 0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0038 
SALES PHARMACEUTICALS -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 
SALES RAW MATERIALS -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0021 0.0040 
TRADE BALANCE -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 
NET ACCOUNTING PROFIT 0.0019 0.0019 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0024 
SCIENTIFIC GRADE -0.1602 -0.1595 -0.0508 0.0576 0.1095 0.2034 
SPANISH FIRM -0.2640 -0.2628 -0.0837 0.0950 0.1803 0.3351 
EUROPEAN UNION FIRM -0.1949 -0.1940 -0.0618 0.0701 0.1332 0.2475 
These results are based on the regression in column (1) of Table 4. The numbers in bold correspond to 
criteria which are statistically significant at the 5% level. To interpret this table, focus on the Spanish firm 
(second to last line). Being Spanish decreases the probability of getting a final grade of 1 by 0.2640, while it 
increases the probability of getting a final grade of 6 by 0.3351.    
 
 
